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Executive Summary
Compensation accounts for over 
ninety percent of instructional costs 
in public schools, yet the process for 
setting the level and structure of 
educator compensation is rarely 
rational or strategic.   Ideally, total 
compensation and its components 
would be structured to recruit, retain, 
and motivate the highest quality 
professional workforce for a given 
level of expenditures. In this policy 
brief we examine two aspects of 
teacher compensation policy in K-12 
education that are problematic; rigid 
salary schedules and retirement 
benefit systems.
Introduction
During the 2004-05 school year, the 
most current year for which national 
data are available, U.S. public schools 
spent $179 billion on salaries and $50 
billion on benefits for instructional 
personnel. These compensation 
payments account for 55 percent of 
K-12 current expenditures and 90 
percent of instructional expenditures. 
As large as these expenditures are, 
they do not fully capture the resources 
committed to K-12 compensation, 
since they do include billions of 
dollars of  unfunded liabilities of 
pension funds and retiree health 
insurance for teachers and adminis-
trators (Clark, 2008). If productivity 
doubles as an input accounting for 
one percent of total cost, there will be 
little overall efficiency gain. However, 
given the large share of K-12 costs 
that arise from educator compensa-
tion, even small gains in efficiency 
would yield large benefits.  
A burgeoning research literature 
outside of K-12 highlights the impor-
tance of human resource (HR) 
policies within organizations. To 
quote a leading textbook in the field:  
“…human resources are key to orga-
nizational success or failure. It is 
perhaps going too far to say that 
excellent HR policies are sufficient 
for success. But success with poor HR 
policies is probably impossible, and 
the effects of improved HR success 
are potentially enormous.” (Baron 
and Kreps, 1999) Compensation is a 
central part of a strategic HR policy.
Unfortunately, the compensation 
“system” for public school teachers is 
neither strategic nor integrated. 
Rather, it is best seen as an amalgam 
of different components, reflecting 
pressures from different constituen-
cies, legislative tinkering, and legacies 
from earlier vintages of employment 
agreements, but with little consider-
ation to overall efficiency. For exam-
ple, teacher base pay is set by salary 
schedules that have evolved through 
generations of collective bargaining 
agreements, or in non-bargaining 
states like Texas, legislative fiat. Base 
pay is augmented by various types of 
district or state-wide salary supple-
ments (e.g., coaching, career ladder). 
Finally, deferred compensation in the 
form of retirement pay inhabits 
another silo altogether, with policy 
typically set by statewide pension 
boards dominated by senior educators 
and administrators. Teacher compen-
sation is the sum of all of these parts 
(plus fringe benefits such as health 
insurance).
Ideally, the overall compensation 
package would be designed to recruit, 
retain, and motivate the highest 
quality professional workforce for any 
given level of expenditures. In prac-
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tice, the pieces of educator compen-
sation systems  – current salary, 
additional compensation, benefits, 
deferred compensation –  are set in 
ad hoc ways with little coordination or 
consideration of strategic tradeoffs, 
or tested against labor market bench-
marks. The result is excessive costs, 
inefficiency, and perverse incentives.1
The Single Salary Schedule
The most important determinant of a 
teacher’s pay is the salary schedule in 
the district. These salary schedules are 
nearly universal in public school 
districts. For example, Table 1 reports 
the 2007-08 salary schedule for the 
Houston Independent School Dis-
trict. The rows are years of experience 
and the columns refer to graduate 
degrees. Some districts have more or 
fewer experience steps and differences 
in the step gains. Some have more 
columns (e.g., BA, BA+15 credits, 
BA+30 credits). However, the basic 
structure – with years of experience 
and graduate credits or degrees as the 
only or primary determinants of base 
pay – is common over many school 
districts. In addition to district 
schedules, some states (primarily 
southern states including Texas) have 
state-wide salary schedules that set a 
minimum pay level for all public 
school teachers in the state. Districts 
are free to set pay in their own sched-
ules above the state schedule, and 
many do. Table 2 reports the 2008-
09 Texas state salary schedule.
These teacher salary schedules are 
sometimes referred to as “single salary 
schedules,” a term reflecting their 
historical development. Kershaw and 
McKean (1962) note that there were 
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Bachelors Degree Masters Degree Doctoral Degree
Step
Experience
(years)
Annual
Salary
Step
Experience
(years)
Annual
Salary
Step
Experience
(years)
Annual
Salary
1 0-1 $44,027 1 0-1 $45,057 1 0-1 $46,087
2 2 $44,477 2 2 $45,507 2 2 $46,537
3 3 $44,992 3 3 $46,022 3 3 $47,052
4 4 $45,507 4 4 $46,537 4 4 $47,567
5 5 $46,022 5 5 $47,052 5 5 $48,082
6 6-8 $47,476 6 6-8 $48,506 6 6-8 $49,536
7 9-10 $48,801 7 9-10 $49,831 7 9-10 $50,861
8 11 $49,251 8 11 $50,281 8 11 $51,311
9 12 $49,814 9 12 $50,844 9 12 $51,870
10 13-14 $51,838 10 13 $52,868 10 13 $53,318
11 15-17 $53,601 11 14 $53,368 11 14 $53,818
12 18-19 $55,138 12 15-16 $55,138 12 15-16 $56,791
13 20-22 $56,791 13 17-19 $56,791 13 17 $57,241
14 23-25 $58,444 14 20-21 $58,444 14 18-19 $60,091
15 26-27 $60,091 15 22-23 $60,091 15 20-21 $61,741
16 28-29 $61,741 16 24-25 $61,741 16 22-23 $63,395
17 30+ $65,222 17 26-27 $63,395 17 24-25 $65,045
18 28 $63,845 18 26 $65,495
19 29+ $68,590 19 27+ $71,960
Table 1 — Salary Schedule: Houston Independent School District 
(2007-2008)
Source: http://www.nctq.org/salary_schedule/32-08.pdf
1 A perverse incentive is an incentive that has an unintended and undesirable effect that is against the interest of the incentive makers. Perverse incentives by definition 
produce negative unintended consequences.
Experience
(years)
Monthly
Salary
Annual Salary
(10 month contract)
0 $2,732 $27,320
1 $2,791 $27,910
2 $2,849 $28,490
3 $2,908 $29,080
4 $3,032 $30,320
5 $3,156 $31,560
6 $3,280 $32,800
7 $3,395 $33,950
8 $3,504 $35,040
9 $3,607 $36,070
10 $3,704 $37,040
11 $3,796 $37,960
12 $3,884 $38,840
13 $3,965 $39,650
14 $4,043 $40,430
15 $4,116 $41,160
16 $4,186 $41,860
17 $4,251 $42,510
18 $4,313 $43,130
19 $4,372 $43,720
20+ $4,427 $44,270
Table 2 — Texas State Teacher Salary Schedule 
(2008-2009)
Source: http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/school.finance/salary/
three phases in the development of 
teacher pay regimes. The first phase, 
which lasted roughly until the begin-
ning of the 20th century, saw teacher 
pay negotiated between an individual 
teacher and a local school board. As 
school districts consolidated and grew 
in size, this type of salary determina-
tion became increasingly unpopular 
with teachers. With consolidation and 
growth, the monopoly power of 
school districts in the labor market 
increased and charges of favoritism 
were common. In response to these 
problems, there was gradual move-
ment toward the use of salary sched-
ules that differed by grade level and 
position. “Typically, the salaries 
differed from grade to grade, and 
high school salaries would inevitably 
be higher than those at the elementary 
level.” (Kershaw and McKean, 1962)   
The current phase began in the 
1920’s and accelerated in World War 
II and the immediate post-war pe-
riod. This is characterized by what is 
termed the “single salary schedule.” 
An education commentator writing in 
the 1950’s noted that, “the distin-
guishing characteristic of the single 
salary schedule is that the salary class 
to which the classroom teacher is 
assigned depends on the professional 
qualifications of the teacher rather 
than the school level or assignment.” 
Kershaw and McKean write, “The 
single salary schedule was regarded as 
bringing a feeling of contentment and 
professionalism. A teacher would no 
longer be an elementary teacher, but a 
teacher, a member on equal footing 
of the profession that included all 
teachers.” By 1951, 98 percent of 
urban school districts employed the 
single salary schedule (Lieberman, 
1956).
These salary schedules for teachers 
contrast with the situation in most 
other professions. In medicine, pay 
of doctors and nurses varies by 
specialty. Even within the same 
hospital or HMO, pay will differ by 
specialty field. In higher education 
there are large differences in pay 
between faculty by teaching fields. 
Faculty pay structures in most higher 
education institutions are flexible. 
Starting pay is usually market-driven 
and institutions will often match 
counter-offers for more senior 
faculty whom they wish to retain. 
Merit or performance-based pay is 
commonplace.  Ballou and Podgursky 
(1997) and Ballou (2001) report 
generally similar findings for private 
K-12 education. Even when private 
schools report that they use a salary 
schedule for teacher pay, payments 
“off schedule” are common.  
Rigid salary schedules would not be as 
costly if the factors rewarded, teacher 
experience and graduate education, 
were strong predictors of teacher 
productivity. Surveys of the education 
production function literature find 
little support for a positive effect of 
teacher Masters Degrees, and teacher 
experience has little effect beyond the 
first few years (Hanushek, Kain, 
O’Brien, and Rivkin, 2005).   
Hanushek (2003) reports that of 41 
“value-added” estimates of the effect 
of education levels on teacher effec-
tiveness (primarily MA’s), not a single 
study found a statistically significant 
positive effect. In fact, ten of the 
studies found negative effects. In 
spite of the depth and consistency of 
this negative finding in the research 
literature, school districts continue to 
spend billions of dollars annually 
rewarding MA degrees.
Effects on Teacher Quality
There is an adage in economics: “You 
can’t repeal the law of supply and 
demand.” By this economists mean 
that if governments or regulators do 
not let prices clear a market then 
some other mechanism will. For 
example, if city governments use rent 
controls to set rates below the market 
clearing level, then shortages will 
develop. In such a case the market will 
“clear” in the sense that individuals 
will have to invest more of their time 
searching for an apartment. Some will 
give up and quit. Others will pay 
bribes. And the overall quality of the 
apartment stock may decline. All of 
these non-price mechanisms will act 
to clear the market instead of price. It 
is useful to keep this idea of non-
price clearing in mind as we consider 
the effects of teacher salary schedules 
on the level and distribution of 
teacher quality.
Shortages by field
The training, working conditions, 
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and non-teaching opportunities for 
teachers on average differ significantly 
by teaching field, yet salary schedules 
within a school district treat all 
teachers the same. On average the 
non-teaching opportunities for, say,  
high school physical science teachers 
are more remunerative than for 
second grade teachers, yet the salary 
schedule in a district gives both 
groups identical salaries. A nationally 
representative survey of school ad-
ministrators conducted by the US 
Department of Education found that 
in 2003-04, 75 percent of respon-
dents who had recently hired in the 
field reported it was “easy” to fill 
elementary education vacancies, 
whereas only roughly 30-35 percent 
with science and math openings, and 
30 percent of those recruiting in 
special education gave such an assess-
ment. More to the point, only two 
percent of the elementary vacancies 
could not fill the position or reported 
it “very difficult” to fill. Similar 
statistics for science and math were 
around 30 percent (21 percent for 
biology) and 35 percent for special 
education. Since salaries are rigid, 
the market thus clears in a quality 
dimension. Science, math, and 
special education teachers are less 
likely to have majors in their field, 
regular licenses, and are more likely 
to be teaching “out of field” than 
elementary school teachers (Podgur-
sky, 2008).
Novice teachers concentrated in 
high-poverty schools 
A consistent research finding is that 
novice teachers (e.g., first or second 
year) tend to produce smaller student 
achievement gains for students than 
more experienced teachers (Rivkin, 
Hanushek, and Kain, 2005). Within 
a district, schools differ in attractive-
ness as places to teach. Higher socio-
economic status (SES) schools are 
typically perceived as more desirable 
places to teach than low SES schools 
by most teachers. Teachers will thus 
tend to use their seniority to transfer 
into the former and out of the latter. 
Or, if they cannot transfer, they will 
simply quit. In either case, children 
in low SES schools will have greater 
exposure to novice teachers (Iaterola 
and Steifel, 2003). This is a direct 
consequence of a uniform salary 
schedule in the district. If pay is 
equalized then teacher quality is 
disequalized across schools. In order 
to equalize quality it is necessary to 
disequalize pay. Some districts have 
begun to experiment with bonuses to 
induce their better teachers to trans-
fer to low performing schools 
(Prince, 2002).
More effective teachers have no additional 
incentive to stay on the job.
A consistent research finding is that 
the distribution of teacher effective-
ness within schools is large (Kane, 
Staiger, and Rockoff, 2006). Some 
teachers are consistently better at 
raising student achievement than 
others. In fact, the difference in 
learning growth for a student exposed 
to a teacher in the top versus the 
bottom quintiles of effectiveness is 
substantial, and if cumulated over 
several years, could substantially 
narrow or widen achievement gaps. 
However, the salary schedule provides 
no differential incentive for the more 
effective teachers to remain in the 
school or the profession. A more effi-
cient pay structure would attempt to 
retain the more effective and shed the 
less effective teachers. It is well 
recognized in the literature on per-
formance pay that differential re-
cruitment and retention of more 
productive employees can be at least 
as important as motivation in boost-
ing overall performance (Podgursky 
and Springer, 2007).
Confounding Factors:  
Tenure and the Size of 
Wage-Setting Units
Two other institutional factors in 
teacher labor markets exacerbate the 
inefficiency effects of single salary 
schedules. The first is teacher tenure. 
Even if experience per se did not raise 
a teacher’s effectiveness, in principle 
a seniority-based wage structure 
might be efficient if less effective 
teachers were weeded out over time. 
In this case, what looks like a reward 
for experience would actually be a 
reward for performance. However, 
personnel policies in traditional 
public schools are not likely to pro-
duce such an effect. Teachers in 
traditional public school districts 
receive automatic contract renewal 
(tenure) after two to five years on the 
job. After receiving tenure it is very 
difficult to dismiss a teacher for poor 
job performance, a finding which has 
been widely documented (Bridges, 
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1992). Thus, the presence of teacher 
tenure laws makes the economic costs 
associated with single salary schedules 
even greater.
A second factor that increases the cost 
of rigid district salary schedules is the 
size of the wage-setting units. Other 
things being equal, the larger the unit 
size, the greater the economic dam-
age. The wage-setting unit in private 
and charter schools is typically the 
school, whereas in traditional public 
schools, wage-setting occurs at the 
district level. The average charter 
school has 16 full-time teachers; a 
private school has just 15. In tradi-
tional public schools, fifty percent of 
teachers are employed in districts with 
at least 560 other teachers where the 
level and structure of teacher pay, 
benefits, and recruiting policies are 
centralized at the district level. Given 
the skewed distribution of districts by 
size, the typical teacher finds himself 
or herself in a wage-setting unit that 
is quite large. This has two conse-
quences. First, it makes the market 
for teachers less flexible and competi-
tive. From an efficiency point of view, 
it would be better to have ten “dis-
tricts” each setting pay for ten schools 
than a single one setting pay for one 
hundred schools.  At least the ten 
smaller districts could compete with 
one another and adjust their sched-
ules to meet their own internal needs, 
and teachers could sort according to 
their preferences over the structure of 
pay. 
Retirement Benef it Systems
Retirement benefits are increasingly 
costly for districts and pension 
incentives in most systems are per-
verse. They are acting to drain quali-
fied teachers out of the profession at 
relatively early ages.
The retirement benefit cost gap 
between teachers and private sector 
professionals is large and widening. 
Costrell and Podgursky (2009b) 
compare employer pension costs as a 
percent of salaries for public school 
teachers versus private sector profes-
sionals. They find that the pension 
costs are higher for teachers, they are 
growing, and that the public-private 
gap is widening. The recent sharp 
drop in the asset values of teacher 
pension funds is almost certainly 
going to accelerate the growth of 
teacher pension costs. This makes it 
important for education policymakers 
to assess whether these increasingly 
costly systems are efficient ways to 
compensate teachers.
Perverse Incentives
Pension wealth does not accrue 
uniformly in teacher pension systems. 
It is heavily backloaded. The incentive 
structure acts to “pull” teachers to 
certain years in which pension wealth 
accrual peaks and then push teachers 
out at an early age (often in her mid 
to late-fifties) because pension wealth 
accrual turns negative (Costrell and 
Podgursky, 2008). Data on the 
timing of retirements suggests that 
teachers (like workers generally) are 
responsive to these incentives. The 
median retirement age for active 
teachers is the mid to late 50s 
(Podgursky and Ehlert, 2007). 
The existing teacher pension systems 
generally produce harsh penalties for 
mobility. Teachers (or administra-
tors) who split a work career between 
two pension systems incur very large 
losses of pension wealth as compared 
to educators who work an entire 
career in a single system. A teacher 
who splits a 30 year career between 
two systems may lose one half or more 
of her pension wealth by age 55 as 
compared to a teacher who remains in 
the same system. A “cash-balance” 
type reform of the teacher pension 
systems, as adopted by many private 
sector firms that retain defined 
benefit pension plans, would smooth 
accrual of teacher pension wealth and 
eliminate these perverse incentives 
(Costrell and Podgursky, 2009a). 
Retiree Health Insurance
Since teachers typically retire well 
before they are eligible for Medicare 
(age 65), there is a strong demand for 
retiree health insurance. Unlike 
teacher pensions, these benefits have 
generally been provided on a pay-as-
you-go basis and not adequately 
pre-funded by districts.  New ac-
counting standards require school 
districts and states to cost out and 
report these liabilities in their annual 
financial reports. The size of these 
liabilities in many cases is very large, 
and is a direct outgrowth of the early 
retirement incentives built into the 
pension systems (Clark, 2009).
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Conclusion
Human resource (HR) policy – the 
recruitment, retention, and motiva-
tion of employees -- is increasingly 
recognized as a critical variable in the 
success of an organization. An inte-
grated and coherent compensation 
policy is the central core of an effi-
cient HR policy. In private and many 
public organizations, the compensa-
tion package is considered as a strate-
gic whole, and carefully designed to 
get the most HR return per dollar of 
compensation. In public K-12 by 
contrast, the compensation “system” 
is fragmented and uncoordinated, 
each piece perhaps responding to 
pressures from a particular constitu-
ency or inherited from an earlier 
contracts, but without systematic 
assessment of the logic or incentive 
effects of the whole.  
Accountability pressures are forcing 
school districts to address the ineffi-
ciencies built into this compensation 
system, and rethink how they are 
spending roughly $250 billion 
annually for compensation of in-
structional personnel. Federal pro-
grams such as the Teacher Incentive 
Fund are encouraging states to ex-
periment with performance and 
market-based pay. States such as 
Minnesota, Florida, and Texas have 
developed programs to encourage 
their districts to develop such pro-
grams. Texas has taken steps in this 
direction with the Texas Educator 
Excellence Grant, and, more recently, 
the District Awards for Teacher 
Excellence. A number of large urban 
districts, most notably Denver, have 
taken important steps in this direc-
tion as well.
Performance and market-based 
incentives are much more common in 
charter schools and are expanding 
with the charter school base.  Less 
movement has occurred in the area of 
teacher pensions; however, large 
unfunded liabilities for pensions and 
retiree benefits are likely to force 
reforms in this area as well. States and 
districts contemplating change should 
consider running pilot programs or 
phasing in changes (or better yet, 
some type of randomized pilot study) 
so as to permit assessment of the 
effectiveness of such reforms.
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